This paper considers supply-side factors underpinning technology forcing by national policymakers in the low carbon vehicle sector. It focuses on five countries -France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK -and examines the driving imperatives for promoting alternative fuel vehicle and electric vehicle uptake. It does so by looking at four over-arching concerns for decision-makers; energy security, sustainable development, impact on the existing automotive sector and the pressure from subnational actors such as city councils. The paper seeks to show that national policy in the five selected countries is heterogeneous in nature making consistent, standardised approaches to policy implementation a challenge, despite the similarity in ambition to advance instances of electromobility and to transition from conventional transport technology to alternatively fuelsourced vehicles.
I. Introduction
Despite the presence of a tight, regulatory framework driving the demand for low emission vehicles and the existence of strong support from industry and from policy makers at various levels of government, the take up of these vehicles by European Union (EU) consumers remains sub-optimal.
Why this is the case is of interest to both policy makers and stakeholders seeking to understand how demand can be increased in the context of challenging emission targets across the globe. This paper will focus on supply-side issues and the role of policymakers in agenda-setting and technology forcing. The aim of the article is to provide an analysis of policy initiatives introduced by five national actors, to understand the decision-making process underpinning the promotion of key technologies central to decarbonising their respective transport sectors. By doing so the discussion will offer improved understanding of the drivers of these policies and enable the identification of successful policy approaches that perhaps can be utilised by other national policy-making units facing similar challenges.
The focus will be placed on five EU member states; France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. These five countries account for 72.8 % of total vehicle production in the EU and four of the five (France, Germany, the UK and Spain) are the largest EU motor manufacturers in terms of number of vehicles produced per annum (ACEA, 2016). The same countries also account for the vast majority of new vehicle registrations in the EU (75.6 %). All five are also legally bound by the same European manufacturing regulations that address carbon emission reduction in the European transport sector. 1 However, the policy response by these countries in terms of promoting carbon free motoring has been notably different, demonstrating the importance of national policy interpretations in technology-forcing. Such is the centrality of these actors that they have had the effect of creating lead markets for certain vehicle types such as, arguably, both hybrid and fully Electric Vehicles (EVs). 2 Yet all five have had varying experiences of low carbon vehicle uptake. By comparing and contrasting their respective approaches to decarbonising their networks an improved knowledge of the drivers of policy can be developed.
To address the issue of policy drivers, the paper utilises the following structure. Initially it considers the role of technological selection in the development of lead markets for key products. Having considered the factors that lead to policy makers preferring different forms of intervention, the 1 A case could also be made for the inclusion of one of the Eastern European countries that accessed to the EU in 2004, the Czech Republic or Slovakia for example. However space prohibits such a discussion here. 2 The term Electric Vehicles (EVs) refers to a wide range of technologies including; battery electric vehicles (BEV), extended range electric vehicles (EREV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV). Hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) that use an e-motor as their secondary rather than primary means of propulsion are not classified as EVs in this paper.
subsequent section details the federal regulations that establish the carbon emission rules for European automakers. Section IV then looks at Low Carbon Vehicle (LCV) and Alterative Fuel Vehicle (AFV) proliferation amongst the selected member states, with particular reference to electromobility and EVs. With this context established the remainder of the paper focuses on comparing and contrasting policy initiatives and identifying the key drivers of same, as well as considering the relative merits of these approaches.
II. Technology-forcing and lead markets
To rapidly decarbonise transport by technology-forcing requires a significant shift in policy-making.
While there are opportunities for market expansion, export and employment growth through policy intervention in lead technologies, in the increasingly complex area of environmental policy, where decisions closely intersect with economic and societal concerns, the role of national institutions is more challenging than ever before (Loomis and Helfland, 2001 ; Brown and Ryan 2011; Annema et al, 2015) . The need for practical considerations in policy formulation can lead policy makers to adopt only incremental changes, fearful that too rapid a transformation might bring about resistance that would lead to policy failure. Identifying optimal conditions for involvement by policy actors in the area of low carbon transport has encouraged a spate of academic analysis, including the development of Cost-Benefit models. For example, as part of the process of determining when intervention was warranted, Greene et al (2010) developed a Cost-Benefit analysis model of ZeroEmission mandates in the US that also incorporated concepts of net social value, network external benefits and adaptation to an uncertain future, offering guidance on intervention for policymakers.
Masiani (2015) also considered the use of Cost-Benefit analysis for electric vehicle policy development in Germany. However, the conclusions reached were that existing models were still limited in their value due to the added complexity of factors such as policy response or integration with other transport sectors into existing Cost-Benefit models.
Intervention by policymakers in environmental, energy and transport sectors is frequently justified by whether it's stimulating industrial innovation, research and development (R&D), or if it is bringing about optimal levels of performance in a socially acceptable manner. Porter et al (1995) However, in terms of low carbon transport policy the situation is complicated by a host of competing priorities of which environmental concerns are but one, if crucial, factor. As Van Geenhuizenet (2007) argues, transport is a highly involved sector involving a complex system incorporating a multitude of factors. In terms of low carbon transport policy, the importance of four broad categories of concern serve to influence decision-making; resource management and energy security, social concerns and sustainability, industrial impact and, finally, local and regional considerations. These competing priorities have served to influence policymakers in the selected countries and, in turn, are primarily a consequence of exogenous factors related to limited resources, environmental challenges and health concerns. It is the interplay of these factors that make decarbonising transport such a complex issue. Responses to this carbon challenge by national policymakers can, by and large, be categorised under two approaches. In the first instance through the use of incentive-based instruments such as emissions taxes, subsidies and tradable allowance systems. Secondly, through direct regulatory instruments, for example technology mandates and performance standards (Goulder and Parry, 2008) . In the instance of the five selected countries, these decisions occur within a well-established and clearly demarcated federal legal structure.
III. Federal legislation and its impact on European automotive manufacturing
The EU regulatory framework that sets CO2 emission standards for motor manufacturers in the five The decision to offer derogations to small-volume manufacturers stemmed from the belief that alternative reduction targets should take into account the technological potential of a given manufacturers vehicle to reduce CO2 emissions, as well as making them consistent with the market segments concerned. Such an approach was defensible as it offered automotive producers flexibility during a transitional period that would allow a smoother changeover, away from traditional, polluting technologies toward cleaner, environmentally responsible technologies. Large-volume manufacturers also benefitted from a degree of leniency during these transitional years; As noted, manufacturers were given allowance to form a fleet pool that measured average emissions from the pool as a whole for purposes of meeting emission reduction targets. Effectively this could be interpreted as allowing manufacturers to continue producing more polluting models as long as this was offset by the new registrations of low carbon emitting vehicles.
A further incentive was the introduction of super credits to promote the production of low emission vehicles. These credits allowed manufacturers of LCVs (below 50 gCO2/Km) to count a single vehicle as multiple vehicles in their fleet. Starting in 2012, each of these vehicles counted as 3.5 vehicles above the 50 gCO2/Km limit. Their value would then be gradually reduced until by 2016 they would only be considered as a single vehicle in the fleet once more. Another round of super credits is set to come online in 2020, when these LCVs (below 50 gCO2/Km) will count as 2 vehicles in a fleet, gradually reducing back down to 1 by 2023. These super credits were used to encourage R&D as well as production of LCVs and ultra-low carbon vehicles.
This approach to both high and low volume manufacturers carried with it certain concerns. For example by allowing manufacturers to average emissions across fleets and pools of fleets, producers could choose to seek out strategic partnerships rather than pursue innovative, technological solutions. For small-volume manufacturers and niche producers, the allowances made in terms of emission targets might potentially discourage the expansion of production beyond the defined limits. Such compromises could feasibly sacrifice optimisation for flexibility. However, it does allow member states greater control over their own domestic automotive sectors. By offering over-arching supply-side interventions with a degree of leeway built-in to regulations, it has allowed member states control over their own policy initiatives with differing results.
IV. Promoting the decarbonisation of the transport fleet
Despite their importance in terms of producing these vehicles, four of the five selected countries have low levels of Alternative Fuel Vehicle (AFV) penetration of their respective fleets; France, Germany, Spain and the UK all record levels below the European Union average of 4.9 % (ACEA, 2016a). 4 Only Italy (9.6%) greatly exceeds the EU average and serves as an important comparator for the other nations. 5 In fact, the larger the vehicle manufacturing base, the likelier it will be that there While the correlation is ambiguous and open to criticism, it does raise some interesting questions on AFV uptake in these countries. All five member states use a range of incentive-based instruments to address the issue of carbon emissions and encourage a move away from traditional internal combustion engine (ICE) technology toward AFVs, most notably EVs, as will be shown. This includes the use of CO2 based motor-based vehicle taxes in some countries, which have been broadly welcomed by car manufacturing representative organisations such as the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA). However, the lack of uniformity in their implementation has caused ACEA some concern (ACEA, 2016b). 
Germany
Annual tax is set at a rate of €2 per 100 cc (petrol) and €9.50 per 100cc (diesel). A further carbon tax is then charged at €2 per gCO2/Km emitted above 95 gCO2/Km.
Italy

None
Spain
Has a variable tax rate for registrations based on carbon emissions of vehicles (4.75% for vehicle s between 121 gCO2/Kmand 159 gCO2/Km and 14.75% for vehicles of 200 gCO2/Km and greater)
United Kingdom
Annual car tax is based on carbon emissions. Vehicles below 100 gCO2/Km are exempt, those above this level taxed up to a maximum of £505 (for vehicles exceeding 255 gCO2/Km). Additionally there is a first year fee; Vehicles below 100 gCO2/Km are exempt, those above this level taxed up to a maximum of £1,100 (for vehicles exceeding 255 gCO2/Km). Liability tax on company cars are also based on carbon emissions. A range of incentives such as tax breaks and preferential parking complement the use of subsidies to promote purchases of EVs. France offers a premium under its bonus-malus system for green vehicles as well as a 'super bonus' for buying a green vehicle and scrapping an old one. Electric vehicles are also exempt from the company car tax. In addition to EVs being exempt from the annual circulation tax in the UK, there is also a one-time subsidy of 35% of the cost of a car, up to a maximum of either £2,500 or £4,500 depending on the model, while 20% of the cost of a commercial vehicle (up to a maximum of £8,000) will be paid by the government. Despite previous German opposition to subsidising EVs, Chancellor Angela Merkel recently announced a deal to supply a subsidy of up to €4,000 for these vehicles as part of a plan to have one million EVs on German roads by 2020 (Bloomberg, 2016). In Italy EVs are exempt from the annual circulation tax for a period of five years.
The level is then set at 75% thereafter. Finally, Spain utilises a scrappage scheme, Programa de Yet, even though the numbers remain small there is still significant variation in terms of penetration of their respective fleets. There are also significant differences in approaches to promoting AFV technologies. Understanding drivers of these policies in the respective countries and how these have translated into consumer uptake will be the focus of the remainder of the paper. In contrast to the above, the main concern for UK energy security is dwindling oil and gas reserves in the North Sea in addition to a number of power plant closures (Bird, 2007) . In 2003 the UK had the highest level of primary energy production among the EU member states, almost double that of Germany. A decade later the UK went from being a net energy exporter to a major importer; the energy equivalent of 94,400 thousand tonnes of oil were imported in 2013 alone (Eurostat, 2015) .
V. Factors underpinning policy-making decisions
Effectively the UK is moving from self-sufficiency to oil, gas and coal import dependence. Renewable energies have consequently become a key component of government policy as part of the environmental challenge, but also in an attempt to limit imports of energy; however penetration rates are still very low at 7. 7 %. Nuclear energy accounted for just 16.6 % in 2013, less in fact than Germany, with the rest of domestic energy production being derived from oil, gas and solid fuels (Eurostat, 2015) . To date the response from the UK government has been to liberalise electricity markets and improve electrical production efficiency as well as usage through an improved smart grid. New capacity built by 2015 consisted mostly of gas and coal-fired stations, as well as wind farms, but longer term plans are less clear (DECC, 2015 ). An increased focus on options such as oil sands, extra-heavy oil, oil shale and coal-to-oil may be one solution, but would do little for carbon reduction.
Imported energy dependence is a major consideration for both of the remaining countries. Italy What emerges from the above is that Member States are heterogeneous when it comes to energy policy. This makes a common energy policy difficult to achieve, but also influences transport policy; countries might accept the broad strokes of EU regulation, but are influenced in their decisionmaking by their own energy production priorities. In turn transport technology choice is, arguably, subordinate to the strategic energy concerns of individual countries. The decision to pursue modal shifts to electric vehicle technology is determined as much by the need to end oil import dependency as by the value of EVs as a clean transport solution. In other areas too these five countries demonstrate pragmatic concerns when it comes to technology forcing.
Sustainable transport solutions
Complementing the question of energy security is the issue of sustainability. If energy security concerns are rooted in rational considerations about the present, sustainability focuses on longer term future-proofing of energy and transport sectors. The perceived economic benefits of early engagement with an emerging industrial sector are clear; entry into emerging markets will allow brand recognition, brand growth and development that late adopters will be forced to compete The commitment to electromobility is predicated on the understanding that it will supply short-tomedium term carbon emission reduction solutions, while expected technology breakthrough will ensure sustainability and competiveness.
The adoption of long-term strategic plans is a common theme amongst all five countries. This not only raises questions over energy security, exposing the country to potential external energy dependency, but also is problematic in the longer-term from a sustainable perspective. In the short-to-medium term there is scope for substantial expansion though, with representatives of the 
Impact on the automotive industry
The global automotive industry remains the largest producer and employer in the global market (Dicken) . Consequently any substantive changes to automotive legislation and policy that could result in major sectoral shifts that are liable to derail national economies and global markets unless carefully and gradually introduced. The carbon emission regulatory framework pursued by countries and organisations with a major automotive presence has, to date, been designed primarily to provide flexibility for the existing automotive industry, to help mitigate the high costs of emission reductions. Firms with extensive capital investments in ICE technology have been given a degree of latitude and time to make the move toward carbon free motoring. This holds true for the five selected countries focussed on in this paper and in actuality ties in closely with their aims for economic sustainability; if social, environmental and economic harmonisation are key factors for the future development of the automotive sector then a smooth transition for the existing industry, with limited disruption to the social and economic balance, also dovetails closely with these aims.
However, the possibility does exist that by providing this flexibility targeted emission levels might lag behind stated objectives (Fontaras and Samaras, 2010).
The automotive sector responds well to a strong, regulatory environment and in fact welcomes 
Pressure from below
While the above three factors can largely be classed as macro in terms of their scale, growing pressure on national and federal policymakers has also become more evident from the meso and micro level, where concerned stakeholders in cities and regions have become increasingly active in their push toward decarbonising local economies and improving air quality in particular. This in turn has forced a response from not just policymakers but also automakers, as legislation and regulation has served to promote the adoption of AFVs, but also to discourage the uptake of traditional ICE vehicles. While federal regulation has offered a degree of flexibility as noted above, regions and cities have been more stringent in their attempts to overcome congestion and improve quality of life. In London, for example, the targeted use of a congestion charge has been used to encourage the uptake of AFVs, as well as to increase revenue. In Germany, the large number of cities exceeding the EU PM10 threshold (Particulate Matter associated with emissions that harm health) has seen some cities, such as Bonn, Dresden and Hannover, introduce Low Emission Zones (LEZs), banning certain categories and classes of vehicles from entering these designated areas. Though this has generated a negative reaction from the German public and served to give automakers considerable difficulties in meeting these requirements, research by Wolff suggests that these zones may have had the effect of increasing the take up of low emission vehicles (Wolff, 2014) . This has included vehicles using ICE technology, but points to a possible means of encouraging AFV consumption and the role regional authorities can have in this process.
In France these Low Emission Zones are still in their investigative phase, though they are currently 
VI. Concluding remarks
This paper has focussed on understanding why leading nations promote key technologies, identifying the factors that serve to influence their decision-making. A range of priorities inform policy-makers thinking; exogenous factors that create the need for decarbonisation of the transport fleet and how they intersect with other competing socio-economic priorities. While the responses by the five selected countries have been broadly similar, the challenges unique to each country have served to alter individual national approaches. Policymakers, forced to navigate a hazardous route forward while remaining cognisant of the needs of the most impacted stakeholders have adopted measures that are simultaneously aspirational and pragmatic.
France, with its excess capacity of electrical power and comparatively cheap energy prices has heavily promoted EV usage, with the support of major French automotive manufacturers such as Renault. Spain, too, has pushed for greater electromobility but has been hindered by economic hardship in promoting uptake; however, the Spanish automotive industry has greatly benefitted from these efforts as it has become a leading producer of EVs. In the UK, energy constraints of a dwindling pool of domestic oil reserves has similarly promoted a desire to electrify the vehicle fleet;
however, the need to expand the national grid has created some concern amongst policymakers and contributes to a more technology neutral approach to carbon emission reduction. Additionally, the dominance of component manufacture in the UK motor industry means the sector is more flexible and less impacted by technology forcing than other countries with greater volume manufacturing of vehicles in evidence. Germany in particular is mindful of the need for a smooth transition from vehicles using ICE technology to AFVs and it is this thinking that also underpins their promotion of the use biofuel and biodiesel as a means to graduate the process of change. Italy too is concerned with protecting its automotive sector. Although energy security is also a major consideration for Italy as it tries to end its oil and gas import dependence, the widespread use of CNG and LPG powered cars in Italy must also be factored in to the decarbonisation process in this country.
What is evident is the heterogeneous nature of decarbonisation of transport across the selected EU member states. Further complicating this process is the organic pressure of urban centres driven by concerns over congestion, pollution and parking, engaging in largely unregulated activities to discourage conventional vehicles from accessing city spaces. This has also led some cities to actively promote the use of certain LCV technologies at the expense of conventional automobiles, further influencing the transition from ICE vehicles top AFVs. The response by policymakers has been necessarily circumspect, encouraging a wide range of actions. Whether this approach is optimal remains to be seen. While a gradual transition that makes allowances for existing socio-economic conditions including industrial presence, consumer preference and strategic resource usage, it may inadvertently slow the pace of change. The fact that all the countries under examination, countries that account for the greatest share of new vehicle registrations in the EU, have such low levels of AFV penetration is a concern for policymakers and stakeholders. In particular, the negligible sales of EVs in these countries after so much emphasis was placed on electromobility suggest that achievements are lagging behind policy goals. Whether these were realistic goals in the first place is a question worth asking, but it cannot be doubted that some review of policy must occur.
